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The increasing involvement of transnational companies (TNCs) in global governance has 
been both applauded for its potential to make governance more effective and criticized for 
lacking democratic legitimization. Hence we investigate the effectiveness of one 
transnational governance regime, corporate sustainability reporting according to the Global 
Reporting Initiative (GRI). We found that the GRI has been successful in terms of output 
effectiveness by promoting the dissemination of sustainability reporting, in particular among 
Asian and South American companies. However, the outcome effectiveness of the GRI is 
limited as reporting showed a rather uniform content across countries and sectors which does 
not reflect materiality considerations. As GRI reporting does not seem to have facilitated 
greater company-stakeholder interaction, its impact effectiveness is likely to be limited too. 
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The global political economy has until recently been characterized by a state-centric order, 
where cooperation between sovereign nation states led to the emergence of stable institutions 
to govern international economic activity (Cutler, 2001; Held, McGrew, Goldblatt, & 
Perraton, 1999). However, in the wake of globalization, state-level governance mechanisms 
have lost some of their regulatory powers to a polycentric system of overlapping centres, 
each having incomplete political authority (Kobrin, 1998; Strange, 1996). These emerging 
transnational governance systems are not only confronted with new challenges, such as 
climate change (Levy & Egan, 2000); moreover, their very nature is changing as alternative 
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actors emerge, such as non-governmental organizations (NGOs) or transnational corporations 
(TNCs) (Kobrin, 1998; Rosenau & Czempiel, 1992; Teegen, Doh, & Vachani, 2004). In 
particular, TNCs have emerged as actors with significant political clout and authority as they 
push for a substitution of institutional arrangements by forms of ‘soft’ regulation (Kobrin, 
2009). In addition to TNCs from developed economies, non-Western TNCs clamour to 
influence the international institutional environment too (van Tulder, 2010). 
These developments have the potential to generate more effective governance regimes (Haas, 
2004; Scholte, 2002). At the same time, corporate involvement in shaping governance 
structures is increasingly becoming detached from the democratically legitimated structure of 
state law (Scherer, Baumann-Pauly, & Schneider, 2013). As the financial crisis has shown, 
many governments in developed countries struggle to fully control corporate activities 
(Crotty, 2009), not to mention states where the enforcement of legal rules is weak or where 
there are no proper legal frameworks in place (Fukuyama, 2004). Many observers thus point 
to a “democratic deficit that emerges when private corporations engage in public policy” 
(Scherer, et al., 2013, p. 473). A key issue for the literature on international relations – and 
neighbouring subjects, such as corporate political activity and corporate social responsibility 
– then concerns the effectiveness of these emerging institutional arrangements. 
We investigate the effectiveness of private transnational regulatory regimes by building on 
contributions from the international relations literature, in particular the distinction between 
output, outcome and impact effectiveness as originally proposed by Easton (1965) and 
developed by Underdal and Young (2004). The subject of our study is one private 
transnational governance regime that is rapidly becoming standard practice among developed 
and developing country firms, namely sustainability reporting according to the guidelines of 
the Global Reporting Initiative (GRI). The aim of the GRI is to promote the dissemination 
and improve the quality of sustainability reporting (GRI, 2006). Focusing on the effectiveness 
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of this particular private transnational governance regime, the GRI should therefore 
contribute to an increased uptake of corporate sustainability reporting (output effectiveness), 
allowing internal and external company stakeholders to more meaningfully interact with the 
respective company on the basis of this information (outcome effectiveness). Ultimately, 
these interactions should result in measurable contributions towards problem solving in the 
areas the company reports on (impact effectiveness). 
Our study is based on an analysis of 933 GRI reports by companies from 30 countries, 
representing seven industries. It captures differences in the engagement with this 
transnational governance regime not only between companies from different industries but 
also between firms from industrialized and emerging economies. As sustainability is context-
specific, we would expect that companies report on those issues that are most material for 
their operations and their stakeholders. Hence, we expected industry and country-level 
differences between companies to lead to significant differences in approaches to 
sustainability reporting. However, whilst we did find some industry-level and country-level 
differences in reporting, these do not appear to be linked to materiality considerations. 
Instead, the dominant pattern emerging from our analysis is that coverage levels across GRI 
indicator categories are very uniform. As report content reflects neither the geographical 
context nor the stakeholder networks companies are embedded in, we have to conclude that 
the GRI – although influential – is fundamentally flawed. 
This paper makes several contributions to the development of the literature. First, as a 
contribution to the international relations and international business literatures, we go beyond 
a dominant focus on North American, European and Japanese firms (Yang, Wang, & Su, 
2006) and offer robust quantitative data for a relatively large sample (n=933) covering a 
genuinely global range of countries. Not least, we provide evidence of the significant level of 
engagement with private global governance by emerging economy firms, in particular by 
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those from South and East Asia as well as South America. Secondly, and more importantly, 
our findings have implications for discussions of the effectiveness of private transnational 
governance. Companies are clearly under pressure to report on their social and environmental 
impacts, but these pressures, by and large, have not translated into differences in terms of 
what they report on. Put differently, the GRI can be considered highly successful in terms of 
output effectiveness. However, the largely uniform content of sustainability reports across the 
sample casts serious doubt on the outcome effectiveness of the GRI. Impaired outcome 
effectiveness, in turn, makes impact effectiveness unlikely too.  
The remainder of this paper is structured as follows. The next section provides an overview 
of the recent emergence of private transnational governance regimes. Subsequently, we 
introduce a model to evaluate the effectiveness of such regimes, building on the distinction 
between output, outcome and impact effectiveness (Easton, 1965; Underdal & Young, 2004). 
The following section reviews the prior literature on corporate sustainability reporting, with a 
focus on country- and sector-level differences in reporting as well as the role of the GRI. We 
then describe and justify the research method, followed by the presentation of findings from 
our empirical analysis. Before we conclude, we discuss the relevance of our findings for 
future research into private governance regimes as well as their managerial relevance with 
regard to the future of corporate sustainability reporting. 
 
2. Theoretical Background and Development of Hypotheses 
2.1. Private Transnational Governance and Corporate Nonmarket Strategy 
Economic activity, both at national and at international levels, requires well-functioning 
institutions. Until recently, this was provided by the sovereign state, which enjoyed a 
monopoly of force within its territory (Cutler, 2001; Held, et al., 1999). Holding the 
undisputed right to design rules within its territory (Held & McGrew, 1993), the sovereign 
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state can provide the institutions to guide economic activities domestically. The sovereign 
state is also authorized to define its relations with other states through international 
agreements (Krasner, 1988); thus being able to bring about institutions to govern economic 
activity internationally. However, such state-level governance structures have been 
challenged by globalization. In the words of Strange (1996, p. 4): “Where states were once 
the masters of markets, now it is the markets which, on many crucial issues, are the masters 
over the governments of the states.” The traditional dominance of the state has increasingly 
given way to the emergence of multiple authorities, in particular in the transnational arena, as 
well as a blurring of responsibilities between public and private sectors (Held & McGrew, 
1998; Kobrin, 2009; Scherer & Palazzo, 2011). The result is a world that is more fragmented 
politically. At the same time, economic interdependence is greater than ever before, as “the 
dramatic increases in the cost, risk and complexity of technology in many industries render 
even the largest national markets too small to serve as meaningful economic units” (Kobrin, 
1998, p. 361). 
 
It is a key feature of the emerging polycentric system of governance (Kobrin, 2009) that it is 
significantly shaped by “the apparent assumption by TNCs and global business associations 
of roles traditionally associated with public authorities” (Ruggie, 2004, p. 502). Such private 
forms of regulation operate through non-state, market-based frameworks to address a wide 
range of externalities of corporate activity, from environmental degradation through labour 
practices in supply chains to violations of human rights (Vogel, 2010). In a similar fashion, 
authors like Scherer, Palazzo and Matten  (2014) stress that by providing welfare and other 
benefits that go beyond their narrow economic role corporations not only directly contribute 
to the production of public goods but also have become political actors (see also Matten & 
Crane, 2005). These developments apply not only to TNCs from developed nations; rather 
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non-Western TNCs increasingly seek influence over the international institutional 
environment too (van Tulder, 2010). 
 
Private sector involvement in global governance regimes highlights the importance of 
companies’ nonmarket strategies. Here Baron (1997) stressed that, since the business 
environment is composed of both a market and a nonmarket environment, companies need to 
develop a strategy that combines market and nonmarket components to generate synergies 
and thus superior overall performance. A key part of nonmarket strategy is business political 
behaviour (Boddewyn & Brewer, 1994) or corporate political activity (Hillman, Keim, & 
Schuler, 2004; Lawton, McGuire, & Rajwani, 2013), which has been defined as corporate 
activities to “influence electoral and legislative/regulatory processes so that the outcomes of 
those processes better reflect the internal goals of the organization” (Baysinger, 1984, p. 
249). However, following Baron and Diermeier (2007, p. 540) we propose that nonmarket 
strategy should go beyond its traditional focus on public institutions, in particular legislative, 
regulatory and judiciary agencies, to also consider the various forms of “private nonmarket 
competition where private interests such as activists or NGOs try to affect company and 
industry practices”. Put slightly differently, we propose that nonmarket strategy means an 
integrated pursuit of both corporate political activity (CPA) and corporate social 
responsibility (CSR) (see also den Hond, Rehbein, de Bakker & Kooijmans-van Lankveld, 
2014). CSR, in turn, can be defined as “the responsibility of enterprises for their impacts on 
society” (European Commission 2011: 6). 
 
The emergence of transnational private governance mechanisms “has been both hailed as a 
highly promising solution to the shortcomings of state regulation and sharply criticized on the 
grounds that voluntary business regulations are inherently incapable of addressing market and 
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regulatory failures” (Vogel, 2010, p. 79). On the one hand, private governance can generate a 
more inclusive, targeted, timely, flexible, and ultimately more effective governance regime 
(Haas, 2004; Scholte, 2002). Indeed, corporate codes of conduct were found to – under 
certain conditions – improve corporate environmental and labour practices (Locke, Kochan, 
Romis, & Qin, 2007). On the other hand, private governance is potentially problematic as 
corporate involvement in shaping governance structures is increasingly becoming detached 
from the democratically legitimated structure of state law (Scherer, et al., 2013). Private 
governance has been particularly criticized for offering insufficient transparency and 
accountability (O'Rourke, 2003); some regimes are not enforced very well or cover only a 
small number of firms in a sector (Vogel, 2010). Given these debates, the research question 
of this paper is how effective private transnational governance systems are. The paper will 
investigate this question with regard to one particular governance regime, namely 
sustainability reporting according to the guidelines of the Global Reporting Initiative (GRI). 
 
2.2. Effectiveness of Governance Regimes 
In order to evaluate the effectiveness of GRI reporting as a private transnational governance 
mechanism, we apply the distinction made in international relations research between output, 
outcome and impact effectiveness as originally proposed by Easton (1965) and developed by 
Underdal and Young (2004). The output effectiveness of an organization can generally be 
described as its formal output, such as norms, regulation, or any specific commitments agreed 
on by the organization’s members. The outcome and impact dimensions of effectiveness both 
refer to consequences in areas that are addressed by the organization. Outcome effectiveness 
refers to behavioural changes of actors evoked by the organization, whereas impact 
effectiveness refers to measurable contributions that are made towards actual problem solving 
(Young, 2002). This typology implies that, in terms of output and outcome effectiveness, we 
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can distinguish between the organizational level and the individual actor level, where impact 
effectiveness exclusively focuses on actions carried out by members of the organization. 
 
This conceptual distinction has repeatedly been applied in recent academic work on the role 
of the private sector in shaping the business-society interface at a transnational level 
(Biermann & Bauer, 2004; Rieth, Zimmer, Hamann, & Hanks, 2007). Applying the 
distinction between output, outcome and impact effectiveness to the UN Global Compact in 
sub-Saharan Africa, Rieth, Zimmer, Hamann and Hanks (2007) found a degree of change at 
the output level as companies are beginning to sign up to UN Global Compact principles; 
whereas change in company behaviour (outcome) and increased corporate contributions to 
solving social and environmental challenges (impact) were more difficult to ascertain.  
 
In the context of sustainability reporting, the publication of a sustainability report can be 
viewed as effective if the sustainability-related information provided in the report forms the 
basis for meaningful interaction between the company and its internal and external 
stakeholders. The company’s internal and external stakeholders should be able to process the 
sustainability-related information most material to them and act accordingly, i.e. reward good 
performers and sanction bad performers, and in turn drive further improvement in 
sustainability performance. Given the context-specific nature of sustainability, we would 
expect different companies and stakeholder groups to focus on different sustainability-related 
priorities. For example, the extent to which challenges, such as climate change, poverty 
alleviation, human rights abuses or biodiversity, are perceived as material for a specific 





The impact of the context-specific nature of sustainability on sustainability reporting can be 
captured through one particular strand of organization theory, namely institutionalism. 
Institutionalism seeks to explain how the organizational field in which an organization is 
embedded and the organization itself influence each other. Organizational action is thus no 
longer defined autonomously by the organization, although the organization does not merely 
react passively to dictates by the field either (DiMaggio & Powell, 1983). Institutions can be 
defined as “shared rules and typifications that identify categories of social actors and their 
appropriate activities or relationships” (Barley & Tolbert, 1997, p. 96, italics removed); they 
operate through regulative, normative and cultural-cognitive processes (Scott, 2008). 
In order to gain access to resources that are imperative for their survival, organizations must 
maintain legitimacy in the eyes of field constituents and hence subject themselves to 
normative pressures. Under conditions of uncertainty organizations are also likely to mimic 
others they perceive to be successful. Coercive pressure occurs where one party, such as the 
state, has the power to establish rules for other organizations (DiMaggio & Powell, 1983; 
Scott, 2008). The organizational field thus leads to a reproduction of system-wide social facts 
at the organizational level (Zucker, 1987). However, organizations are not just passive 
recipients; rather they may have varying degrees of freedom to formulate strategic responses 
to institutional pressures (Oliver, 1991). They may engage in institutional entrepreneurship 
(Greenwood & Suddaby, 2006) or institutional work (Lawrence, Suddaby, & Leca, 2011) to 
consciously seek to change institutional arrangements. 
Given the complexities of modern life, many organizations operate in multiple organizational 
fields. They then become “subject to multiple regulatory regimes, embedded within multiple 
normative orders, and/or constituted by more than one cultural logic” (Kraatz & Block, 2008, 
p. 243). In the literature bodies on international business, CSR as well as sustainability 
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reporting, two conceptualizations of organizational fields seem to dominate, namely at the 
industry and the national level (Delmas & Toffel, 2008; Jennings & Zandbergen, 1995).  
 
2.3.1. Industry Level Institutional Pressures 
The CSR literature has identified industry level pressures as arising from regulators, public 
concern over an industry’s social and environmental impact, as well as through market 
opportunities arising from investment into CSR (Banerjee, 2001; Delmas & Toffel, 2008; 
Sharma & Henriques, 2005). A key form of coercive pressure is regulation, the form and 
rigidity of which is likely to be related to differences in the level of social and environmental 
impacts different sectors generate, such as differences in the amount and toxicity of their 
waste (Banerjee, 2001; Delmas & Toffel, 2008). In terms of normative pressure, industries 
differ in the degree of legitimation that is accorded to the industry by key societal actors, such 
as civil society organizations (Spar & La Mure, 2003) or the media (Bansal, 2005). Hence 
there are differences between sectors in terms of what types of governance regimes get 
adopted and how effective these are (Potoski & Prakash, 2013). 
By contrast, intra-industry similarities may serve as a motivation for firms to imitate 
competitors within their sector (Jackson & Apostolakou, 2010). From such a perspective, 
industries differ in terms of opportunities to generate benefits from CSR initiatives, such as to 
reduce costs or to increase the (perceived) quality of their product (Carroll & Shabana, 2010; 
Epstein & Roy, 2003). Related to this are differences in opportunities for reducing an 
industry’s social and environmental impact through product or process innovation (Hall & 
Vredenburg, 2003).  
The sustainability reporting literature has shown that sector affiliation is a significant 
explanatory variable for the likelihood of a company producing social and environmental 
disclosures as well as the length of these disclosures (Bowen, 2000; Cormier & Magnan, 
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1999; Halme & Huse, 1997; Neu, Warsame, & Pedwell, 1998) (for recent overviews see 
Fifka, 2013; Fortanier, Kolk, & Pinkse, 2011). Based on these insights from the literature, we 
thus hypothesize that industry pressures will shape corporate engagement with CSR 
challenges; we would expect that different industries will reveal differences in the extent to 
which they address social and environmental challenges. More formally: 
Hypothesis 1. There will be industry-level differences in the content of corporate 
sustainability reports. 
 
2.3.2. National Level Institutional Pressures 
Conceptualizations of institutional pressures at national level grapple with wider, more 
diffuse societal expectations. “Members of modern nations look not only for economic 
development, but also for balanced social development within local ecosystems” (Jennings & 
Zandbergen, 1995, p. 1026). These differences between nations in approaches to CSR can be 
explored through the literature on national business systems and varieties of capitalism (Hall 
& Soskice, 2001; Maurice & Sorge, 2000). For example, Whitley (1999) identified 
differences between historically grown institutional frameworks in capitalist economies in 
terms of influences arising from the political system, the financial system, the education and 
labour system and the cultural system (Ioannou & Serafeim, 2012).  
Applying differences in national business systems to CSR, Matten and Moon (2008) argue 
that the traditions of individualism and democratic pluralism in the US have led to a greater 
prominence of market-based self-organization and hence an emphasis on explicitly 
articulated CSR policies, programmes, and practices. By contrast, continental European 
markets tended to be organized by producer group alliances to reflect consensual 
representation of labour and capital or strong government leadership; as a result, European 
CSR has been indirectly expressed through wider systems of responsibility that embrace a 
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broader set of actors than just business. Such differences in national institutions can, in turn, 
affect global governance regimes. For example, Prakash and Potoski (2014) showed that the 
effectiveness of ISO 14001 is shaped by the stringency of a country’s domestic 
environmental regulation: ISO 14001 certifications reduced air emissions in countries with 
less stringent environmental regulations but had no such effect in countries with more 
stringent regulations. 
More recently, the literature on national business systems and varieties of capitalism has been 
extended to cover developing countries and transition economies (e.g. Whitley, 1999; King, 
2007). In parallel, the CSR literature has shown a growing interest in these regions of the 
globe too (Blowfield & Frynas, 2005; Dobers & Halme, 2009; Visser, 2008). Developing 
countries seem to face CSR challenges that are different from those in industrialized nations. 
Social and environmental crises are often more acute, while recent political changes, such as 
moves towards democratization, liberalization and privatization, have created new 
opportunities for the private sector. Hence there is a greater expectation that business will 
contribute to socio-economic development (Eweje, 2006; Peinado-Vara, 2006). At the same 
time, many developing countries display governance gaps so that compliance with even basic 
legislation cannot be taken for granted (Fox, 2004), while pressure from environmental 
NGOs and domestic consumers is largely absent (Logsdon, Thomas, & Van Buren, 2006).  
Along these lines, country-level differences in non-financial reporting have been identified in 
terms of the likelihood of reporting (Halme & Huse, 1997; Kolk, 2010), report content 
(Baskin, 2006; Chapple & Moon, 2005; Kolk, 2005) or the likelihood of assurance (Kolk & 
Perego, 2010). To an extent, these differences stem from country-level differences in 
reporting legislation (Guthrie & Parker, 1990; Kolk, Walhain, & Van de Wateringen, 2001); 
yet, the salience of specific pressure groups (Neu, et al., 1998; Van der Laan Smith, Adhikari, 
& Tondkar, 2005) as well as underlying cultural and institutional contexts (Fortanier, et al., 
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2011; Kolk, 2005) have also been shown to result in country-level differences in 
sustainability reporting. In line with such arguments in the literature, we would expect to be 
able to identify differences in sustainability reporting depending on the geographic context 
from which a company hails. Therefore, we hypothesize that: 
Hypothesis 2. There will be country-level differences in the content of corporate 
sustainability reports. 
 
2.4. The Global Reporting Initiative (GRI) 
In recent years, the GRI has emerged as the key normative body in the field of sustainability 
reporting (Etzion & Ferraro, 2010; Levy, Brown, & De Jong, 2010). To date, several 
thousand companies have used the GRI guidelines as guidance for their sustainability reports. 
Moreover, reporting according to the GRI guidelines is widely considered as means of 
enhancing the credibility of a sustainability report (KPMG, 2011). The GRI guidelines 
stipulate (a) generic principles for the process of publishing a sustainability report, and (b) 
standard disclosures specifying the actual content of these reports. Principles for ensuring 
report quality include aspects such as balanced reporting, clarity and accuracy, and generally 
applicable rules for the definition of reporting boundaries. Another key principle is that of 
materiality, i.e. the consideration of all “significant economic, environmental, and social 
impacts, or that would substantively influence the assessments and decisions of stakeholders” 
(GRI, 2006, p. 8). In other words, companies need to tailor their reports to the characteristics 
of their operations as well as to the information needs of their stakeholders.  
The GRI Guidelines prescribe a certain amount of standard disclosures as base content that 
should appear in any sustainability report (GRI, 2006). Thus the Guidelines contain a set of 
79 performance indicators covering six sustainability-related dimensions, namely the 
economic dimension (9 indicators), the environment (30), labour practices and decent work 
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(14), human rights (9), society (8) and product responsibility (9). Of these, 49 indicators are 
defined as core indicators, i.e. a company ought to report on these irrespective of sector 
affiliation or geographic context. The other 30 indicators are defined as additional ones, i.e. 
they can be addressed depending on the nature of the company’s operations and the 
information needs of its stakeholders. Furthermore, the GRI has specified sector-specific 
protocols (e.g. for apparel & footwear, automotive, public agencies, mining & metals) to 
acknowledge the specific characteristics of particular sectors.  
In summary, the GRI Guidelines aim to promote sustainability reporting in a way that enables 
companies to report on a baseline set of core indicators while at the same time tailoring their 
reporting to the context-specific information needs of their various stakeholder groups. 
Stakeholders should be empowered through the provision of sustainability-related 
information, so that “information serves as an instrument of private civil regulation by 
mobilizing its recipients to demand certain performance levels and providing a channel for 
transparency and accountability” (Levy, et al., 2010, p. 95). Expectations behind the GRI thus 
are that companies are transparent and accountable with regard to those aspects of their 
sustainability performance that are most material for their stakeholders, and that stakeholders 
then process this information and adapt their decision-making accordingly. To be effective, 
GRI reporting should reflect context-specific sustainability-related priorities. The content of 
sustainability reports should not be uniform but instead be tailored to the information needs 
and materiality considerations of different stakeholder groups. We therefore hypothesize: 
Hypothesis 3. The content of sustainability reports reflects context-specific 
prioritizations of CSR. 
3. Research Methods 
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We test our hypotheses through a content analysis of 933 GRI sustainability reports by 
companies from seven different sectors and 30 different countries.  
 
3.1. Sample Selection 
Our data collection used the Corporate Register database to generate a suitable sample of 
corporate sustainability reports. Whilst there is a rapidly growing literature focusing on 
sustainability reporting among developing country companies (Baskin, 2005; Chapple & 
Moon, 2005; De Villiers & Van Staden, 2006; Thompson & Zakaria, 2004), thus overcoming 
an initial Northern bias in the non-financial reporting literature, to date very few studies 
undertook a direct comparison between developed and developing country reporters (for 
notable exceptions see e.g. Preuss & Barkemeyer, 2011; Welford, 2005). The aim of this 
study was therefore to create a balanced sample covering both developed and developing 
country firms.  
Our sample selection process used the following rationale: 1) to ensure a sufficient minimum 
size of country subsamples, only countries with a minimum number of 10 reports were 
included; and 2), as one of the central dimensions in this study is sector, only sectors with a 
minimum number of 20 G3 sustainability reports from non-OECD countries were selected for 
analysis.  For the sectoral classification of industries, we followed the classification used by 
the Corporate Register website. These criteria were met by seven industries: electricity; gas, 
water & multiutilities; industrial metals; mining; oil & gas; banking & finance; construction. 
By contrast, whilst reporting has become relatively widespread in sectors such as industrial 
transportation, chemicals or travel & leisure, the vast majority of reporting firms of those 
sectors are based in Europe or North America. As a result, these sectors were not included in 
the sample. Data collection took place between July 2009 and January 2010. To ensure 
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consistency, the final sample consists of documents reporting on the years 2006-2009, all of 
which comply with the same version of the GRI Guidelines (i.e. G3). 
Our initial sample consisted of 1118 reports, which underwent screening. As the analysis 
focused on company priorities across the total of 79 GRI G3 indicators, those reports that did 
not contain a GRI content index listing the indicators used in the report were excluded from 
the sample. In total, the final sample consists of 933 GRI G3 reports from 30 countries (Table 
1). Banking & finance represents the largest sector within the sample (n=209), followed by 
electricity (188), gas, water & multiutilities (139), construction (138), mining (98), oil & gas 
(98) and industrial metals (63). In terms of countries of origin, Spain constitutes the largest 
subsample (n=142), followed by Brazil (79), Italy (75) and the USA (56). In terms of region 
of origin, Europe represents the largest subsample (n=472), followed by South America 
(173), North America (103), Asia (76), Australia/New Zealand (66), and Africa (46). 
*********************************** 
TAKE IN TABLE 1 ABOUT HERE 
 *********************************** 
3.2. Variables 
The extent to which a set of indicators is addressed within each category as well as across the 
set of 79 GRI G3 indicators was used as dependent variable. Hence, OLS regressions were 
performed for the dimensions of economic indicators (9 indicators), environmental indicators 
(30), labour practices and decent work indicators (14), human rights indicators (9), society 
indicators (8), and product responsibility indicators (9). In addition to industry affiliation, 
country of origin and region of origin, a number of further independent variables were used in 
the analysis. Sales and the number of employees were included as indicators of company size, 
and the ratio of international employees to total employees was used as a measure of a 
company’s degree of internationalization. Two measures were used to capture changes in 
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sustainability reporting over time: (a) the total number of sustainability reports, and (b) the 
number of GRI G3 reports published by the company prior to the report at hand. Finally, 
GDP per capita for the country of origin in the year of report publication and UN Global 
Compact membership were included in the analysis. GDP per capita serves as an indicator for 
the level of economic development in the company’s country of origin, while UN Global 
Compact membership indicates that a company participates in other sustainability-related 
private transnational governance regimes beyond the GRI. 
  
3.3. Data Analysis 
The GRI content index of each of the 933 reports was transcribed into an SPSS database for 
subsequent analysis. Each indicator the company claimed to have fully or partially addressed 
in the report was assigned the value 1; all indicators not addressed in the report were marked 
as 0. Only the generic set of 79 core and additional GRI G3 indicators were considered; 
supplementary indicators used by the companies – as for example those defined in the sector-
specific GRI protocols in the case of mining and industrial metals – were not considered as 
these apply to individual sectors only and hence would have skewed the data. 
As an initial step, a descriptive statistical analysis established mean coverage levels across the 
total sample and for each indicator category. Subsequently, a series of OLS regression 
analyses were performed to identify how the different independent variables have shaped the 
content of the sustainability reports, with particular emphasis on sector affiliation and 
country/region of origin. Whilst logistic regression can generally be considered to produce 
more accurate results in terms of goodness of fit compared to linear regression models when 
modelling percentage data (Zhao, Chen, & Schaffner, 2001), a linear regression model can 
still produce adequate results if the data points largely fall in the range between 0.2 and 0.8 – 
and hence effectively follow the linear section of an otherwise sigmoid curve (cf. Cox & 
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Wermuth, 1992; Howell, 2002). The advantages of choosing a linear regression model for the 
purposes of this paper lie in its relative simplicity and the ability to express the extent to 
which each group of independent variables explains the variance in the dependent variable in 
one simple measure (R
2
). To test the linear model, the actual number of indicators addressed 
was also used as the dependent variable, which produced similar results. 
4. Results 
4.1. Overall Patterns 
A summary of the results of the descriptive content analysis of the GRI G3 reports is 
provided in Table 2. The average company in the sample reports on 57.1% of the 79 GRI G3 
indicators (45.1 indicators of 79). Of these, 64.5% of the economic indicators are addressed 
on average (5.8 of 9), as well as 55.6% of the environmental indicators (16.7 of 30), 70.6% of 
the labour indicators (9.9 of 14), 47.3% of the human rights indicators (4.3. of 9), 57.0% of 
the society indicators (4.6 of 8), and 43.2% of the product responsibility indicators (3.1 of 9). 
Roughly 37.0% of the average company’s disclosure focuses on environmental performance. 
Social performance indicators (as an aggregate figure of the categories labour, human rights, 
society and product responsibility) account for 50.1%, whereas economic performance 
indicators account for 12.9% of the total indicators reported. 
 
*********************************** 
TAKE IN TABLE 2 ABOUT HERE 
*********************************** 
In terms of sector affiliation, relatively modest sector-level differences can be identified: 
mining (62.9%) and electricity (61.1%) show the highest levels of coverage, followed by gas, 
water & multiutilities (59.5%), industrial metals (59.5%) and oil & gas (59.3%). Only 
banking & finance (52.5%) and in particular construction (49.3%) diverge from this 
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homogeneous pattern. Construction consistently shows the lowest or second-to-lowest 
coverage levels, with the exception of the environmental category. Mining shows the highest 
or second-to-highest coverage levels throughout, with the exception of product responsibility. 
Differences between the seven sectors are particularly pronounced in the cases of labour 
rights (∆coverage = 25.6%) and human rights (∆coverage = 25.4%). In contrast, only 
relatively subtle differences can be identified in the five remaining categories (∆coverage 
ranging from 9.2% to 17.8%) as well as in terms of overall coverage of indicators (∆coverage 
= 13.5%). 
*********************************** 
TAKE IN FIGURE 1 ABOUT HERE 
*********************************** 
Figure 1 illustrates the uniform patterns emerging across the different GRI indicator 
categories. All sectors with the exception of construction typically move within a narrow 
band. Construction shows lower than average coverage levels across all indicator categories, 
but nevertheless follows the same pattern in that economic and labour rights indicators are 
most popular whilst human rights and product responsibility indicators are rarely covered. 
There are only two notable cases in which this general pattern is broken, with mining 
addressing very few of the product responsibility indicators, and banks providing very little 
information on environmental indicators. 
In addition, clear regional-level differences can be identified. Across the overall set of 79 
indicators, Asian companies clearly show the highest levels of coverage with an average 
value of 66.7%, i.e. 52.7 of 79 indicators are addressed. On the other hand, the lowest levels 
of coverage are found among North American companies (47.6%). Regional differences are 
most pronounced in the categories labour rights (∆coverage = 27.4%), product responsibility 
(∆coverage = 24.7%) and human rights (∆coverage = 23.6%). Nevertheless, as shown in 
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Figure 2, a comparison of regional-level coverage across the different indicator categories 
again reveals uniform patterns. 
*********************************** 
TAKE IN FIGURE 2 ABOUT HERE 
*********************************** 
Whilst overall coverage levels are clearly different between different regions – with North 
American companies addressing less than half of all GRI indicators and Asian companies on 
average addressing more than two thirds of all GRI indicators – the prioritization of indicator 
categories appears to be very similar across all regions.  North American companies show the 
lowest coverage levels throughout, while Asian companies exhibit the highest coverage levels 
in five out of six indicator categories. All other regions move within a relatively narrow range 
between these two extremes. Only very few deviations from these overall uniform patterns 
can be identified. For example, North American companies as well as those from Australia 
and New Zealand show a relatively high coverage of environmental indicators compared to a 
low coverage of the other five indicator categories.  
 
4.2. OLS Regression Analyses 
4.2.1. Model Fit 
Table 3 shows the model fit summaries of the OLS regression analyses. A statistically 
significant improvement in the model fit as a variable is added shows that the variable has 
significant explanatory power and its inclusion in the model can be used to investigate the 
nature of the input-output relationship. Country of origin was coded for all country 
subsamples except Brazil (n=79) which was used as reference group due to the fact that 
Brazilian companies showed the lowest variation from the overall average coverage levels of 
the six indicator categories. The three variable categories sector affiliation, country of origin 
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and all remaining variables (i.e. number of G3 reports, total number of sustainability reports, 
GDP/capita, UN Global Compact membership, number of employees, and 
internationalization scores) were entered separately into the regression analyses to identify 
whether and to what extent they can explain variation in the dependent variable. Variations of 
variable entry were performed, entering the three clusters of variables at different positions. 
Table 3 shows the model fit summaries of those regression analyses in which sector variables 
were entered first, followed by country, and all remaining variables. However, all other 
variations in the order of variable entry produced the same results as presented in Table 3. 
*********************************** 
TAKE IN TABLE 3 ABOUT HERE 
*********************************** 
In terms of explanatory power, R
2
 values range from 0.226 (product responsibility) to 0.338 
(economic indicators). In other words, in the case of economic indicators 33.8% of the 
variation of the dependent variable can be explained by the set of independent variables. 
Entering the variable clusters sector affiliation, country of origin and all remaining variables 
significantly improves model fit in all cases except labour rights: here, sector affiliation does 
not significantly impact model fit. R
2
 values for country of origin and all the other variable 
categories are significant at the p < .001 level throughout. 
 
4.2.2. OLS Regression Results 
With the models fitted as in Table 3, the relationship between sectors, countries and ‘other’ 
variables can be investigated. Table 4 summarizes the results of the OLS regression analyses 
for the individual indicator dimensions as well as across the total set of 79 indicators. In 
terms of total coverage of indicators (Table 4 top left), banking (β = -0.182; p < .001) and 
construction (β = -0.177; p < .001) emerge as the two sectors that show a significantly lower 
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standardized Beta value than electricity, the sector reference group. In addition, a range of 
countries show coverage levels significantly above or below their reference group Brazil. The 
highest standardized Beta value for any of the countries or regions is found in the Spanish 
(0.416; p < .001) and South Korean (0.217; p < .001) subsamples. Significantly lower 
standardized Betas compared to the reference group can be found among Philippine 
companies (β = -0.078; p < .05). 
*********************************** 
TAKE IN TABLE 4 ABOUT HERE 
*********************************** 
Of the additional variables, the number of G3 reports (β = 0.141; p < .001), the total number 
of reports (β = 0.100; p < .001) and UN Global Compact membership (β = 0.194; p < .001) 
show significantly positive standardized Beta values. In other words, companies have a better 
indicator coverage the greater the number of previous (GRI) reports they have published, and 
UN Global Compact members tend to produce more comprehensive reports. In contrast, 
GDP/capita and the number of employees do not appear to have a significant impact on 
indicator coverage in any of the six categories. Examining the individual indicator 
dimensions (remainder of Table 4), the pattern identified above is largely repeated. Across all 
six indicator dimensions, the number of GRI G3 reports and UNGC membership are 
significantly positively related to the extent to which indicators are addressed. The total 
number of previous sustainability reports published is significantly positive in four out of six 
cases. There is only one case (human rights indicators) where the degree of 
internationalization has a significantly positive impact.  
At the sector level, construction shows a significantly lower standardized Beta than the 
reference group in all six cases. Only two other sectors show significantly higher or lower 
standardized Betas in any of the models, namely mining and banking. A higher number of 
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significant divergences can be identified at the country level. Chile, Germany, Portugal, 
South Korea and Spain emerge as country subsamples with a significantly higher 
standardized Beta in three or more out of the six indicator categories. On the other hand, 
Argentina, Hungary, Russia and in particular the Philippines emerge as subsamples showing 
significantly lower standardized Betas in at least one indicator category. Whilst R
2
 values 
vary slightly depending on the order in which the three clusters of variables are entered into 
the regression, a general pattern is that only a relatively small share of the variation of the 
dependent variable can be explained by sector affiliation. Table 5 below provides a summary 
of significant standardized Beta values across the set of regressions. 
*********************************** 
TAKE IN TABLE 5 ABOUT HERE 
*********************************** 
As can be seen, a relatively homogeneous pattern emerges across the different indicator 
categories. The patterns identified in the overall sample (left column Table 5) are largely 
replicated in the six indicator dimensions. GRI report number and UNGC membership 
consistently have a significantly positive effect on indicator coverage; the total number of 
sustainability reports has a positive impact in four out of six indicator categories. By contrast, 
company size (as measured by the number of employees) and GDP/capita do not appear to 
affect coverage. There is only one single case where results can be identified for any of the 
independent variables that do not fit the above pattern, namely mining showing two positive 
(environmental and human rights indicators) and one negative (product responsibility) 
deviation from the reference group.  
 
At the country level, no such deviating case can be identified. Instead, the uniform regional-
level patterns identified in Figure 2 above are generally replicated by the regression results. 
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Nevertheless, the regressions reveal significant country-level deviations within these regions. 
Throughout, Philippine companies show clearly lower coverage levels than their Asian peers; 
likewise, German, Spanish and Portuguese companies produce clearly more comprehensive 
reports than, for example, their Eastern European counterparts. One general observation is 
that companies from emerging economies, such as South Korea, Mexico and Chile, are 
among those showing highest coverage levels throughout, whereas some of those countries 
typically considered to be pioneers in sustainability reporting provide comparatively little 
information in their reports. It should be noted that whilst no significant effects can be 
identified for the UK and US subsamples, these showed significantly negative effects in all 
other model specifications; these negative effects only disappeared once GDP per capita and 
UNGC membership were introduced into the model reported above. 
 
5. Discussion 
Sustainability reporting according to the GRI guidelines represents an emerging private 
transnational governance regime. Wanting to generate a more finely grained picture of the 
involvement of companies – from both developed and developing economies – in ‘soft’ 
regulation and thus the effectiveness of this particular private transnational governance 
regime, this study aimed to go beyond the dominant focus in international business on North 
American, European and Japanese firms (Yang, et al., 2006) to present a more genuinely 
global picture of corporate engagement with such governance regimes. Since the prior 
literature had identified industry and country of origin as key institutional pressures that 
shape a company’s approach to social and environmental challenges (Delmas & Toffel, 
2008), our study aimed to tease out what the relative importance of these two key institutional 
influences is. Examining this question through an international comparison of corporate 
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sustainability reporting according to GRI, we found clear industry-level and country-level 
differences, thereby supporting hypotheses 1 and 2.  
However, these country-level differences revealed two unexpected patterns. Firstly, a range 
of emerging economy companies – in particular Asian and South American companies – tend 
to publish more comprehensive sustainability reports than most of their developed country 
peers. Secondly, despite country-level differences in the comprehensiveness of reporting, no 
evidence of clear country-level prioritizations of indicator categories emerged. In other 
words, whilst reporting is more extensive in some countries than in others, there were no 
significant differences in terms of the extent to which different indicator categories were 
addressed. This is particularly surprising as, on average, companies address only 45 out of the 
79 GRI indicators. Hence, we would have expected the materiality criterion to be crucial in 
this selection process, leading to different sector- and country-level profiles. In summary, our 
findings do not support hypotheses 3.  
A functioning reporting regime should empower stakeholders through the provision of 
sustainability-related information. It should help companies to be transparent and accountable 
with regard to those aspects of their sustainability performance that are most material for their 
stakeholders, and stakeholders should then be able to integrate this information into their 
decision-making. Given the context-specific nature of sustainability, the above content 
analysis of sustainability reports should have revealed context-specific prioritizations of 
sustainability indicators. However, the overarching pattern we found was one of uniform 
report content across different sectors and countries. This lack of materiality considerations 




Following Easton’s (1965) distinction between output, outcome and impact effectiveness, it 
can be argued that the GRI has been successful in terms of output effectiveness by promoting 
the increased dissemination and standardization of sustainability reporting. Yet, we have to 
conclude that its outcome effectiveness is limited as it does not appear to allow internal and 
external stakeholders to meaningfully interact with the respective companies on the basis of 
the information provided in these reports. If it did, report content would not show the uniform 
patterns identified in the above analysis, but instead reflect context-specific materiality 
considerations. As a consequence, the impact effectiveness of GRI reporting is also limited as 
it is unlikely that GRI reporting will result in measurable contributions towards problem 
solving in the areas companies reports on. 
 
5.1. Relevance for Future Research 
Our study has implications for future research both into international differences in CSR and 
into the effectiveness of governance regimes. To start with the former, one particular finding 
that invites discussion here is the high level of engagement with CSR in developing 
countries, in particular in South and East Asia. At a first glance, this would seem to be 
counter-intuitive. Many developing countries suffer from governance gaps due to weak, 
under-resourced or corrupt governments (Visser, 2008). They often have less of an active 
civil society (Mercer, 2002), while pressure from domestic consumers on companies to 
improve their social and environmental performance is largely absent too (Logsdon, et al., 
2006). In addition, in many developing countries compliance with even basic legislation 
cannot be taken for granted (Escobar & Vredenburg, 2011; Fox, 2004). 
There are three main explanations for this unexpected result. First, Asian firms may indeed be 
CSR leaders. There is evidence that the role of business is seen in many developing countries 
and transition economies as encompassing a wider spectrum of roles as well as a broader 
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range of stakeholders than in industrialized nations (Lacy, Cooper, Hayward, & Neuberger, 
2010). Some developing country firms, such as the Tata group in India, can lay claim to a 
long engagement with social and environmental issues (Sivakumar, 2008). Furthermore, as it 
is widely known that environmental and labour standards are weaker in many developing 
countries, considerable pressure has built up upon developing country firms to address their 
social and environmental impacts (Chandler, 2003; Christmann & Taylor, 2006; Gugler & 
Shi, 2009). More extensive reporting by developing country firms may thus reflect a greater 
exposure of these firms to a number of CSR challenges that are specific to the contexts they 
operate in.  
Second, the more extensive reporting by Asian firms may be decoupled from their underlying 
CSR performance. As civil society pressure is stronger in industrialized nations, companies 
from North America or Europe may run a greater risk of being punished for unrealistic 
reporting (Lyon & Maxwell, 2011). Restraint in sustainability reporting by firms from 
industrialized nations may also be driven by a fear of litigation. It has been observed, for 
example, that the litigious environment of the US was one of the reasons why US 
corporations were much slower to sign up to the UN Global Compact than European firms 
were (Williams, 2004). Third, developing country firms typically started to report at a later 
stage than their developed country counterparts (Kolk, 2010). The reporting regimes already 
established in these pioneer firms could have created path dependencies in terms of the range 
of indicators that they report on, whereas firms that started to report more recently might aim 
to comply with the most recent version of the GRI guidelines. 
In terms of implications for future research into the effectiveness of governance regimes, the 
uniform coverage levels across the six GRI categories in the country subsamples lend 
themselves to the conclusion that sustainability reports may not be too closely related to the 
actual impact of the reporting companies. To a certain extent, the absence of sector- or 
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country-specific CSR profiles may be the result of an “upward harmonization” caused by the 
GRI Guidelines as well as other global standards and guidelines in the context of 
sustainability reporting and CSR more generally (Fortanier, et al., 2011). However, it should 
be noted that, on average, companies in the sample still only reported on 57% of all GRI 
indicators, i.e. any existing upward harmonization is not particularly strong. Other 
explanations of the uniform reporting patterns could be that companies choose to report on 
indicators for which data is easily available, or indicators that are in line with the way in 
which they wish to portray themselves. Whatever the case, it is likely that report content is 
selected on the basis of criteria other than the materiality of the information in the context of 
a given company. The results therefore point to sustainability reporting as a form of 
symbolic, rather than of substantive engagement with CSR (Christmann & Taylor, 2006; 
Westphal & Zajac, 1994). Such symbolic adoption may eventually risk devaluing 
sustainability reporting to the status of a management fad.  
 
5.2. Managerial Relevance 
The uniform reporting patterns within different countries and sectors – and the absence of 
specific impact profiles – led us to the conclusion that sustainability reporting may reflect 
symbolic rather than substantive engagement with CSR, which in turn leads to implications 
for sustainability reporting and for CSR practice more widely. Our findings indicate that the 
pressures from the different organizational fields have driven companies to publish 
sustainability reports but, by and large, have not translated into differences in terms of what 
they report on. 
Such observations have affinity with the evaluation of the contemporary audit culture in CSR 
by Kemp, Owen and van de Graaff (2012). They suggest that audits are hampered by an 
“over-reliance on external parties to generate performance data against pre-selected 
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indicators” (Kemp, et al., 2012: 5), which leads to a limited ability of these audits to 
“stimulate internal engagement around social and organizational norms and principles” 
(Kemp, et al., 2012: 1). Such a decoupling of formal organizational structures and actual 
actions of organizations (Meyer & Rowan, 1977) has also been a recurring theme in research 
into other CSR tools, such as corporate codes of conduct (e.g. Christmann & Taylor, 2006; 
Stevens, Steensma, Harrison, & Cochran, 2005). In the context of sustainability reporting, 
companies seem to use these reports as a symbolic means to signal consistency with external 
expectations without necessarily invoking substantive change within their organizations (see 
e.g. Ashforth & Gibbs, 1990; Richardson, 1985). 
The central role of headquarters in sustainability reporting may in fact result in a skewed 
representation of a company’s social and environmental performance. This argument goes 
back to the distinction between different levels of strategy making within a firm (Beard & 
Dess, 1981; Hambrick, 1980; Hitt & Ireland, 1985). Whilst Banerjee (2001) argues that 
environmental management tools commonly are confined to strategies at the corporate and 
functional levels without sufficient linkages to the overarching enterprise strategy level, 
sustainability reporting may, in turn, be confined to the enterprise level without sufficient 
linkages to subordinate strategy levels. In particular large TNCs, which need to coordinate, 
integrate and exchange CSR-related resources among many geographically dispersed 
subsidiaries (Strike, Gao, & Bansal, 2006), may struggle to reflect the full range of social and 
environmental challenges across the full range of their locations. 
 
5.3. Limitations of the Study 
Like all research, this paper has a number of limitations that we wish to acknowledge. 
Perhaps most importantly, all companies included in the analysis can be seen as constituting 
“best practice” in terms of sustainability reporting as they have in some way or another 
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adopted the GRI G3 reporting guidelines (cf. Kolk, 2010). There are further limitations 
arising from us analyzing only the GRI content index rather than the full report, as the 
majority of reports offer no external verification whether the indicators listed in the content 
index have actually been sufficiently addressed. Nevertheless, plausibility checks were 
performed on all reports included in the sample to ensure that the GRI report content index 
was an accurate summary of the report content. Reports that did not meet this condition were 
excluded from the sample. As with previous studies into sustainability reporting, this study is 
biased toward large companies, as larger companies are more likely to produce sustainability 
reports in the first place. The mean value for the number of employees of the companies 
included in this study is 30,856; the median value is 5,623. A final limitation is that – as with 
previous studies into corporate sustainability reporting – the focus of this study is on 
reporting rather than actual CSR performance (Gray, Kouhy, & Lavers, 1995; Moneva, 
Archel, & Correa, 2006).  
 
6. Conclusions 
The starting point for this paper was the rise to prominence of novel forms of transnational 
governance that complement the state and blur the lines between the responsibilities of public 
and private sector actors (Held & McGrew, 1998; Kobrin, 2009; Scherer & Palazzo, 2011). 
TNCs increasingly respond to and participate in these emerging governance systems through 
their international nonmarket strategies (Baron, 1997; Bonardi, Holburn, & Vanden Bergh, 
2006). These developments have the potential to generate more effective governance regimes 
(Haas, 2004; Scholte, 2002); yet, they are also potentially problematic due to the democratic 
deficit that results from the involvement of private sector organizations in public policy 
(Kobrin, 2009; Scherer, et al., 2013). In order to generate a more finely grained picture of this 
involvement of companies – from both developed and developing countries – in private 
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governance, we investigated one particular governance structure, namely corporate 
sustainability reporting according to the GRI guidelines. 
 
Our study presented evidence of the growing aspirations of developing country firms to 
become involved in the shaping of transnational governance systems. However, exactly what 
to make of their involvement is more difficult to gauge. Our study leaves open three 
possibilities. Firstly, they could be seen as outperforming companies from developed 
countries at their ‘own game’ of CSR. Secondly, there is the suspicion that developing 
country firms merely pay lip service to social and environmental commitments (a similar 
critique has, of course, been levelled at developed country firms; see e.g. Banerjee, 2008). 
Thirdly, path dependence in CSR tools may propel them along a trajectory that is different to 
that of firms with a longer standing history of engagement (cf. Fortanier, et al., 2011). Any of 
these three possibilities may lead to greater volatility for the emerging governance system. 
 
To evaluate the effectiveness of the GRI as a governance system we applied the distinction 
between output, outcome and impact effectiveness (Easton, 1965; Underdal & Young, 2004). 
We found that the GRI has been successful in terms of output effectiveness by promoting the 
increased dissemination and standardization of sustainability reporting. However, we also 
have to conclude that the outcome effectiveness of the GRI is limited. Despite some country 
and sectoral differences, the overarching pattern we found was one of uniform report content 
across sectors and countries. Report content is thus unlikely to have been driven by 
materiality considerations. In other words, GRI reporting has not enabled internal and 
external stakeholders to meaningfully interact with the respective companies on the basis of 
the information provided in these reports. As a consequence, the impact effectiveness of GRI 
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reporting is also limited as it is unlikely that GRI reporting will result in measurable 
contributions towards problem solving in the areas the company reports on.  
 
With regard to the ‘vigorous debate’ about whether private sector involvement in global 
governance regimes produces more sustainable outcomes (Prakash & Potoski, 2014), our 
study thus concludes that the involvement of the international business community in 
sustainability reporting as a particular form of private governance has not (yet?) led to the 
well-designed institutions that are a prerequisite for effectively tackling the sustainability 
challenges humanity faces. Having said this, the mismatch between output effectiveness on 
the one hand and outcome and impact effectiveness on the other hand can only occur in the 
absence of stakeholders actively requesting companies to be transparent and accountable on 
those performance aspects that they perceive to be most relevant. To put it bluntly, it seems 
that stakeholders expect companies to publish sustainability reports but do not necessarily 
expect to read these. Both reporting companies and their stakeholders will need to step up 
their efforts in order to allow sustainability reporting to reach its full potential. 
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Figure 1: Coverage of GRI indicators: Sector-Level Comparison 
 
 Figure 2: Coverage of GRI indicators: Regional-Level Comparison 
 
 











Banking Construction Total 
Spain 2 0 6 18 18 58 40 142 
Brazil 10 8 4 37 5 7 8 79 
Italy 0 0 6 11 22 14 22 75 
USA 0 4 15 19 9 4 5 56 
Australia 0 18 3 12 11 9 2 55 
Canada 2 10 11 6 4 14 0 47 
Chile 1 15 2 6 8 9 1 42 
South Africa 6 19 3 0 1 8 4 41 
Portugal 0 0 2 3 15 9 11 40 
UK 1 7 4 0 4 6 11 33 
South Korea 3 0 5 12 5 6 0 31 
Netherlands 4 0 4 0 5 10 5 28 
France 0 0 4 5 6 8 4 27 
Russia 7 3 10 3 2 0 0 25 
Germany 4 0 0 0 6 9 4 23 
Austria 0 0 2 5 3 6 2 18 
Colombia 0 1 2 9 3 1 2 18 
Switzerland 0 3 0 2 3 6 4 18 
China 4 0 6 6 0 1 0 17 
India 5 3 2 0 0 1 2 13 
New Zealand 0 0 0 10 3 0 0 13 
Peru 0 1 0 7 0 4 1 13 
Sweden 3 0 0 5 0 0 5 13 
Hungary 0 0 0 4 2 7 0 13 
Mexico 0 3 3 0 1 1 3 11 
Norway 4 0 2 2 0 1 1 10 
Argentina 0 1 0 3 1 5 0 10 
Japan 1 0 1 2 0 4 0 8 
Finland 6 0 0 1 0 0 0 7 
Philippines 0 2 1 0 2 1 1 7 
Total 63 98 98 188 139 209 138 933 
Table 2: Results of Descriptive Analysis 
  
Total Number of Indicators Economic Environmental Labour Rights Human Rights Socioeconomic Product Responsibility 
 
(n) Nb (79) Mean S.D. Nb (9) Mean S.D. Nb (30) Mean S.D. Nb (14) Mean S.D. Nb (9) Mean S.D. Nb (8) Mean S.D. Nb (9) Mean S.D. 
                                              
Total Sample (933) 45.1 0.571 18.75 5.8 0.648 2.57 16.7 0.556 7.52 9.9 0.706 3.55 4.3 0.473 3.11 4.6 0.570 2.58 3.9 0.432 3.11 
                                              
Industrial Metals (63) 46.97 0.595 17.10 6.00 0.67 2.17 18.87 0.63 7.19 9.90 0.71 3.23 3.94 0.44 2.75 4.56 0.57 2.61 3.70 0.41 2.85 
Mining (98) 49.68 0.629 16.05 6.30 0.70 2.24 20.12 0.67 6.52 10.08 0.72 2.97 5.41 0.60 2.82 4.93 0.62 2.46 2.85 0.32 3.16 
Oil & Gas (98) 46.83 0.593 19.87 5.91 0.66 2.50 17.93 0.60 7.49 9.65 0.69 3.56 4.64 0.52 3.29 4.91 0.61 2.45 3.79 0.42 3.31 
Electricity (188) 48.28 0.611 18.56 5.92 0.66 2.53 18.71 0.62 6.85 10.38 0.74 3.39 4.43 0.49 3.26 4.85 0.61 2.70 4.00 0.44 3.24 
Gas, Water & Multi-
utilities 
(139) 47.01 0.595 19.93 5.96 0.66 2.59 18.06 0.60 7.18 10.00 0.71 3.57 4.21 0.47 3.30 4.41 0.55 2.71 4.37 0.49 3.13 
Banking (209) 41.50 0.525 17.64 5.81 0.65 2.57 12.43 0.41 6.39 9.86 0.70 3.72 4.28 0.48 2.95 4.67 0.58 2.31 4.45 0.49 2.91 
Construction (138) 38.99 0.493 19.03 5.16 0.57 2.94 14.71 0.49 7.96 9.09 0.65 3.90 3.12 0.35 2.81 3.62 0.45 2.66 3.28 0.36 2.88 
 
                                            
Africa (43) 45.33 0.574 19.51 6.37 0.71 2.19 16.19 0.54 8.70 10.16 0.73 3.57 4.65 0.52 3.29 4.67 0.58 2.55 3.28 0.36 3.47 
Asia (76) 52.66 0.667 17.47 6.42 0.71 2.43 19.66 0.66 7.12 11.17 0.80 3.18 5.21 0.58 2.81 5.21 0.65 2.33 4.99 0.55 3.07 
Europe (472) 44.38 0.562 18.14 5.78 0.64 2.65 16.17 0.54 7.17 10.01 0.72 3.43 4.06 0.45 2.96 4.37 0.55 2.63 3.99 0.44 2.99 
North America (103) 37.59 0.476 20.56 4.90 0.54 2.61 15.28 0.51 7.65 7.33 0.52 3.83 3.13 0.35 3.36 4.18 0.52 2.54 2.77 0.31 3.24 
South America (173) 48.08 0.609 18.72 6.12 0.68 2.46 17.08 0.57 8.39 10.70 0.76 3.08 5.25 0.58 2.98 4.95 0.62 2.54 3.98 0.44 3.03 
Oceania (66) 45.35 0.574 16.95 5.91 0.66 2.26 18.50 0.62 5.88 9.05 0.65 3.55 3.50 0.39 3.35 4.64 0.58 2.56 3.76 0.42 3.25 
 























Sector 0.198 .039 .033 18.44262 .039 6.294 6 926 .000   
Country 0.489 .240 .210 16.67052 .200 8.149 29 897 .000   
Other 0.566 .320 .289 15.81771 .080 17.555 6 891 .000 1.365 
Economic 
  
Sector 0.121 .015 .008 2.55923 .015 2.280 6 926 .034   
Country 0.539 .291 .263 2.20612 .276 12.040 29 897 .000   
Other 0.581 .338 .307 2.13916 .047 10.506 6 891 .000 1.515 
Environmental 
  
Sector 0.363 .132 .126 7.03356 .132 23.458 6 926 .000   
Country 0.496 .246 .216 6.66146 .114 4.667 29 897 .000   
Other 0.556 .310 .278 6.39450 .064 13.743 6 891 .000 1.354 
Labour rights 
  
Sector 0.111 .012 .006 3.54151 .012 1.912 6 926 .076   
Country 0.515 .266 .237 3.10244 .253 10.677 29 897 .000   
Other 0.547 .299 .267 3.04187 .033 7.013 6 891 .000 1.457 
Human rights 
  
Sector 0.193 .037 .031 3.06087 .037 5.943 6 926 .000   
Country 0.42 .177 .145 2.87571 .140 5.244 29 897 .000   
Other 0.513 .264 .230 2.72878 .087 17.533 6 891 .000 1.434 
Society 
  
Sector 0.165 .027 .021 2.55668 .027 4.319 6 926 .000   
Country 0.43 .185 .153 2.37732 .158 6.000 29 897 .000   
Other 0.515 .265 .232 2.26511 .080 16.180 6 891 .000 1.562 
Product responsibility 
  
Sector 0.17 .029 .023 3.07409 .029 4.607 6 926 .000   
Country 0.418 .174 .142 2.87994 .145 5.450 29 897 .000   














Coefficients   
Beta Std. Error Beta   Beta Std. Error Beta 
(Constant) 40.805 3.482       (Constant) 5.346 .471     
Banking -8.190 1.757 -.182 ***   Construction -.933 .270 -.129 ** 
Construction -9.353 1.993 -.177 ***   Chile 1.408 .447 .114 ** 
Chile 10.313 3.308 .114 **   Germany 2.492 1.038 .150 * 
Germany 18.435 7.672 .153 *   Hungary -1.683 .721 -.077 * 
India 12.316 5.153 .077 *   Philippines -2.537 .886 -.085 ** 
Mexico 12.848 5.296 .074 *   Portugal 2.163 .641 .171 ** 
Philippines -16.914 6.554 -.078 *   South Korea 2.858 .744 .199 *** 
Portugal 14.854 4.742 .161 **   Spain 3.362 .777 .470 *** 
South Korea 22.674 5.503 .217 ***   G3 Report Nb .399 .106 .111 *** 
Spain 21.699 5.748 .416 ***   UNGC Membership .706 .163 .133 *** 
G3 Report Nb 3.696 .781 .141 ***   
Note: R2 = .338 (ps < .001). *p < 0.05, **p < .01 and *** p < .001. 
Total Report Nb .484 .166 .100 **   
UNGC Membership 7.503 1.206 .194 ***             
Note: R2 = .320 (ps < .001). *p < 0.05, **p < .01 and *** p < .001.   
LABOUR RIGHTS Unstandardized Coefficients 
Standardized 
Coefficients   
    Beta Std. Error Beta 
ENVIRONMENTAL Unstandardized Coefficients 
Standardized 
Coefficients 
  (Constant) 9.936 .670     
  Banking -.964 .338 -.113 ** 
Beta Std. Error Beta   Construction -1.576 .383 -.158 *** 
(Constant) 14.540 1.408       Chile 1.971 .636 .115 ** 
Mining 2.919 .921 .119 **   Philippines -2.493 1.260 -.061 * 
Banking -6.654 .710 -.369 ***   Portugal 2.634 .912 .150 ** 
Construction -3.684 .806 -.174 ***   South Korea 4.075 1.058 .206 *** 
Chile 2.867 1.337 .079 *   Spain 3.709 1.105 .375 ** 
Germany 7.116 3.102 .147 *   G3 Report Nb .505 .150 .102 ** 
India 5.212 2.083 .081 *   UNGC Membership .980 .232 .134 *** 
Mexico 5.522 2.141 .079 *   
Note: R2 = .299 (ps < .001). *p < 0.05, **p < .01 and *** p < .001. 
New Zealand 6.537 2.599 .102 *   
Philippines -5.495 2.650 -.063 *             





Coefficients South Korea 7.735 2.225 .184 **   
Spain 7.171 2.324 .342 **   Beta Std. Error Beta 
G3 Report Nb 1.220 .316 .116 ***   (Constant) 3.570 .499     
Total Report Nb .212 .067 .109 **   Construction -1.192 .285 -.164 *** 
UNGC Membership 2.865 .488 .185 ***   Chile 1.959 .474 .157 *** 
Note: R2 = .310 (ps < .001). *p < 0.05, **p < .01 and *** p < .001. 
  Germany 2.619 1.099 .157 * 
  Hungary -1.510 .764 -.069 * 






  Philippines -2.168 .939 -.072 * 
  Russia -1.303 .573 -.081 * 
Beta Std. Error Beta   South Korea 2.328 .788 .162 ** 
(Constant) 4.256 .601       Spain 2.377 .823 .331 ** 
Mining 1.095 .393 .108 **   G3 Report Nb .541 .112 .150 *** 
Construction -1.225 .344 -.140 ***   Total Report Nb .062 .024 .093 ** 
Argentina -2.061 .945 -.068 *   UNGC Membership .870 .173 .164 *** 
Philippines -2.294 1.131 -.064 *   
Note: R2 = .265 (ps < .001). *p < 0.05, **p < .01 and *** p < .001. 
South Korea 2.445 .949 .141 *   
G3 Report Nb .430 .135 .099 **             






Coefficients Internationalization 1.029 .390 .097 **   
UNGC Membership 1.336 .208 .209 ***   Beta Std. Error Beta 
Note: R2 = .264 (ps < .001). *p < 0.05, **p < .01 and *** p < .001. 
  (Constant) 3.157 .616     
  Mining -.962 .403 -.095 * 
            Construction -.743 .353 -.085 * 
            Chile 1.452 .585 .097 * 
The reference group for Sector is Electricity and for Country Brazil.   Mexico 2.074 .937 .072 * 
  New Zealand 2.391 1.137 .090 * 
  Portugal 2.171 .839 .141 * 
            South Korea 3.233 .973 .186 ** 
            Spain 3.350 1.017 .387 ** 
            G3 Report Nb .602 .138 .139 *** 
            Total Report Nb .061 .029 .076 * 
            UNGC Membership .746 .213 .117 *** 
            
Note: R2 = .226 (ps < .001). *p < 0.05, **p < .01 and *** p < .001. 




Table 5: Patterns Emerging from OLS Regression Analyses 






Industrial Metals               
Mining     Positive   Positive   Negative 
Oil & Gas               
Utilities               
Banking Negative   Negative Negative       
Construction Negative Negative Negative Negative Negative Negative Negative 
                
                
G3 Report Number Positive Positive Positive Positive Positive Positive Positive 
Total Report Number Positive   Positive   Positive Positive Positive 
Internationalization         Positive     
Employees               
UNGC Membership Positive Positive Positive Positive Positive Positive Positive 
GDP/capita               
                
                
Argentina         Negative     
Australia               
Austria               
Canada               
Chile Positive Positive Positive Positive   Positive Positive 
China               
Colombia               
Finland               
France               
Germany Positive Positive Positive     Positive   
Hungary   Negative       Negative   
India Positive   Positive         
Italy               
Japan               
Mexico Positive   Positive       Positive 
Netherlands               
New Zealand     Positive       Positive 
Norway           Positive   
Philippines Negative Negative Negative Negative Negative Negative   
Portugal Positive Positive Positive Positive     Positive 
Russia           Negative   
South Africa               
South Korea Positive Positive Positive Positive Positive Positive Positive 
Spain Positive Positive Positive Positive   Positive Positive 
Sweden               
Switzerland               
UK               
USA               
                
 
Note: The reference group for Sector is Electricity and for Country Brazil. Only differences are listed 
that are significant at the p < .05 level. 
 
